Ilmu grafis tutorial desain macam-macam jenis kertas digital photo printing atau jenis kertas untuk mencetak foto digital dengan kualitas dan harga yang beragam. Perkembangan alat cetak (printer) sekarang ini sangat cepat, sampai-sampai kita belum sempat mengenal satu jenis printer, jenis yang lain sudah beredar dipasaran. Berbeda dengan kertas photo printing yang cenderung tetap, walaupun ada perbaikan berupa kulitas kertas dan kekuatannya. Bagi kita yang akan menggeluti dunia Digital Photo Studio mengenal jenis kertas photo printing wajib hukumnya, karena hal ini berhubungan langsung dengan kepuasan konsumen.


Bukan berarti harga kertas mahal akan menghasilkan hasil cetakan optimal, pengetahuan jenis printer (teknologi, rpm dan tinta yang dipakai) dan jenis kertas foto sangat menentukan hasil akhir cetakan (diluar kemampuan editing foto). Untuk itu kita perlu mencocokkan jenis printer, jenis tinta, rpm printer dengan jenis kertas untuk menghasilkan kualitas cetakan foto yang sesuai bahkan memuaskan konsumen.

Ada beberapa jenis kertas foto printing yang banyak beredar dipasaran, diantaranya :
1. Matte / Doff paper
Sangat mudah menyerap tinta sehingga bisa dipakai untuk ngumpetin kualitas tinta dan printer sekaligus tidak memantulkan cahaya. Mencetak foto warna bisa dilihat dari kebutuhannya. Kalau untuk dibingkai atau banyak dipegang-pegang, kertas doff lebih awet dan tidak lengket. Kertas jenis ini seringkali menjadi rekomendasi untuk kertas cetak foto dengan hasil yang bagus.

2. Sublime Paper
Kertas jenis ini bukan digunakan untuk mencetak foto sebagai pajangan dirumah, didompet atau untuk dibingkai tetapi kertas ini digunakan sebagai mediator (media perantara) transfer gambar ke t-shirt (kaos). Jadi bila kita ingin sebuah gambar dipindahkannya ke t-shirt (kaos) maka gunakanlah jenis Sublim Paper karena kertas ini mampu memindahkan tinta dengan maksimal ke t-shirt.

3. Double-Side Paper
Jenis kertas ini mampu digunakan untuk mencetak foto pada kedua sisinya (depan dan belakang). Kualitas foto yang dihasilkan juga cukup bagus, tidak terlalu mengkilap dan cenderung doff. Jenis kertas ini cocok digunakan untuk mencetak pamflet yang biasanya digunakan untuk sarana promosi, sehingga para konsumen dapat melihat dikedua sisinya.

4. fiber matte
Kertas Fiber Base paling tahan lama, karena dia menggunakan kertas dengan pH netral ( biasa di sebut Archival Paper ).

5. Pemium Glossy foto Paper
Kertas jenis ini biasa disebut oleh para penggunanya dengan sebutan high glossy, kertas jenis ini mampu menghasilkan cetakan dengan efek yang lebih mengkilap. Kertas jenis ini sangat cocok untuk mengcetak foto dengan resolusi tinggi. Walaupun harga kertas ini lebih mahal tetapi jika kita gunakan, akan menghasilkan cetakan foto yang maksimal dan lebih cerah.

6. Sticker Glossy foto Paper
Sering kita menjumpai sticker yang menampilkan foto dengan warna dasar kertas putih dan mengkilap, jenis ini sangat cocok untuk keperluan pembuatan sticker serta mampu mencetak foto beresolusi tinggi.

7. Laster foto Paper
Laster foto paper biasanya digunakan untuk keperluan dokumenter karena jenis kertas ini sangat awet bahkan bisa bertahan hingga puluhan tahun, tidak mudah pudar, mampu menghasilkan efek doff, dan sangat cocok untuk foto dengan resolusi tinggi. Permukaan kertas yang mirip kulit jeruk adalah ciri khas untuk membedakan dengan jenis kertas lain. Ketahanan hasil cetakan membuat para konsumen puas, mungkin jenis ini bisa menjadi pertimbangan jika kita ingin serius didunia digital foto printing.

8. Glossy foto Paper / glanz paper
Kertas ini merupakan jenis standar cetak foto. Dengan jenis kertas yang mengkilap, permukaan memantulkan cahaya, permukaan lebih lengket terhadap kaca pigura dan putih mampu menghasilkan cetakan yang standar. Dapat digunakan untuk foto resolusi tinggi dan harga kertas yang relatif murah (standar cetak foto).

9. Canvas Paper
Jenis kertas ini jika kita gunakan untuk mencetak foto akan menghasilkan cetakan dengan sentuhan canvas layaknya sebuah lukisan. Hasil akhir cetakan akan menampilkan foto yang persis dengan kertas canvas.

10. Inkjet Paper
Kertas ini kurang cocok untuk keperluan digital foto printing, jenis kerta inkjet ini biasanya digunakan untuk keperluan grafis, seperti mencetak sketsa gambar, proof arsitektur rumah, grafik bar, dan sebagainya. Kualitas kertasnya lebih bagus dari jenis HVS karena serapan pada tinta lebih bagus dan cepat kering.

11. Metallic paper
Seperti glossy, tapi lebih mengkilap lagi, ada sedikit warna keemasan /metalik. Metallic paper mempunyai permukaan halus dan terlihat agak mengkilat. Sangat cocok dengan namanya karena ada titik-titik metallic pada permukaan kertas ini.

12. Metallic + laminating paper
Hampir sama dengan metallic paper namun pada salah satu sisi ada plastik atau sejenisnya yang menutupi.

13. silky paper
Permukaan kertas lembut namun tidak mengkilat. Daya lekat tinta cukup tinggi sehingga tinta tidak mudah bercecer. Sekaligus bagian permukaan kertas ini tidak mudah terbawa oleh head printer membuat hasil cetakan menjadi lebih baik.

Itulah jenis-jenis kertas yang banyak beredar dipasaran, tetapi sebenarnya masih banyak jenis lainnya. Jenis yang sudah dijelaskan adalah yang paling mudah untuk ditemukan disekitar kita. Kemampuan kita sangat mempengaruhi hasil akhir cetakan, dengan mengenal jenis kertas memudahkan kita menyesuaikan dengan keperluan cetak. Setiap merk kertas mempunyai tingkat daya serap tinta yang berbeda yang juga akan berpengaruh pada hasil cetakan. Ada baiknya Anda berkonsultasi dengan penjual kertas (grosir) untuk mengetahui hasil lebih detail atau mencobanya satu persatu untuk mendapatkan pengalaman. Namun jika sekedar mini studio, ambil kertas glossy dan doff sudah mencukupi.

 

MACAM-MACAM JENIS KERTAS DIGITAL PHOTO PRINTING

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

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Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in ‘The Great War of Our Time’

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